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The crisis of law is a given. The nature of the crisis is a matter of
some controversy. The cause of the crisis is a subject of serious con-
cern. The real point at issue is what will follow the crisis.
I
Both books under review belong to the genre of the current crisis.1
The essays within these collections take their place alongside the works
of those who perceive the threat of change and seek to bolster the old
order against it or among those who intone the dirge for the dying
age and welcome the transition to a new one. Early in the century
the ominous predictions of Spengler sat silent on the bookstall tables;2
by 1955 Toynbee's alarm rang true to millions.3 The intervening years
have given us good cause to count the destruction of humankind a
possibility at any moment. But what is the prospect if Armageddon is
somehow avoided? A growing body of thought rejects the notion that
the principal lines of modern Western civilization can be sustained
or expanded to embrace the world. Instead, a new age is seen as emerg-
ing, whether in the awful prospect of a brave new dystopia or the
hopeful image of a new consciousness.
How one appraises the essays in these two books will depend greatly
upon one's view of the nature of the change the world is experiencing.
I take the principal features of the change to be these: (1) A basis for
t Henry R. Luce Professor of Law, Hampshire College; Professor of Law, University
of Utah. A.B. 1957, J.D. 1960, Stanford University.
1. See, e.g., J. ELLUL, TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); D. MEADOWS el at., TnHE LIMITs
To GROWTH (1972); W. THOMPSON, AT THE EDGE OF HISTORY (1971).
2. 0. SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEsr (1926).
3. 9 A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 406-644 (1954).
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a way of life that can only be described as affluent exists in the tech-
nology of production and distribution. The fact that the possibility
has been realized by a mere handful of the earth's people calls into
question the capacity to universalize this affluence, but does not in
the least reduce the demand by those excluded to share in it. The
achievement of affluence, however, has a dry and bitter taste in the
mouths of many of those who are supposed to enjoy it. (2) Instead
of delighting in the earthly paradise of material goods, the affluent
society has discovered a whole new set of human problems, centering
in the realm of the interpersonal, which seem to have the same urgency
that the problem of achieving economic growth once did. We have
discovered adolescence, sexuality, alienation, old age, and a host of
other conditions which challenge our ingenuity. (3) The entire globe
is involved in the process. Although local conditions are extremely
various, they are no longer isolated from each other. The basis for
this new factor in the human experience is a technology of communi-
cation and transportation whose consequences are just beginning to
be fathomed.4 (4) The reality base through which we experience the
world is itself in dissolution. The premise of the continuous nature of
reality has been shattered. The spatial and temporal dimensions of
life have been shaken fundamentally in the arts, the sciences, and,
increasingly, in our perception of commonplace experience.
None of these developments is complete, and we seem far from the
firm establishment of a new culture, whatever its terms might be. A
large part of the difficulty in analyzing any particular phenomenon
to determine whether perhaps it is a symptom of dissolution or the
harbinger of a future social form is to find the appropriate reference
period in which to place it. There are some who believe that the new
culture is near at hand and may be reached without great strain or
violence. It is difficult for many to be so sanguine, however, given
the distance to be travelled and the many life-ways which must be
disturbed and rebuilt in such a process. We are still discovering how
much of the past we have brought with us into modem society. Un-
doubtedly a great deal of the modern as well as what preceded it will
be carried into the new age.
Such platitudes are little comfort. What concerns us is the potential
of any particular life-form. Should it be supported and expanded for
its relevance and value to the new age, or has it outlived its usefulness?
More likely the question must be faced in more muted tones: should
4. See J. carey, Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan, 27 A.%nocit Rlv. 5 (1967).
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the role of any particular form be limited and narrowed, while yet
new ones are fostered? Questions of this type which seem appropriate
and at least somewhat manageable when applied to very specific forms
-monophonic phonograph records, intercollegiate athletics, juvenile
courts-become more problematic when applied to larger ones. Yet the
assumption of the constant relative strength and absolute vitality of
even such large forms as organized religion, institutionalized govern.
ment, or formal schooling rests uncomfortably in the sight of the
evidence in history and archaeology of their rise and fall-and some-
times rise again.
Law cannot escape this type of scrutiny. Though there is much
evidence that at least some characteristics of legal ordering are cul-
tural universals, the degree to which litigiousness is encouraged, le-
gitimacy is venerated, and legalization is achieved varies greatly both
among and within cultures. It is even a matter of dispute how much
any of it should be desired. We have been warned against the strait-
jacket of legalism, a law-worship which makes law into ideology, still-
ing the spirit.5 Legalism is to law what scientism is to science, with
equally destructive consequences in each case for the object of wor-
ship. Efforts to question the paramount position of law, however,
often are rejected out of hand as a heresy which would prefer to inflict
social incoherence rather than achieve a just and ordered society. The
ellipsis in the argument is too often overlooked. Law is equated with
justice and order or it is at least assumed to be the principal vehicle
of their accomplishment. But a perspective which takes as its premise
that we are in transition to a new age cannot ignore the ellipsis. It
must ask whether law or some other means of seeking justice and order
-an old means to be reactivated or a new one to be discovered-is most
appropriate to the needs of a humane existence within the terms of
a new culture. It must ask what role there is for law in the century
or more of transition whose dislocations we must yet suffer, and it
must answer that question, in large part, by asking what place law
should occupy when the transition is over.
II
As a reaffirmation of the faith, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York celebrated its centennial with a symposium on
the prospect for law, the proceedings of which are now published
5. See generally J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (194).
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under the title Is Law Dead? Eugene V. Rostow asked the participants
to address two issues: "first, the citizen's moral relation to the law
in a society of consent; and, second, the capacity of the American legal
and political order to meet the felt needs of our people for social
justice."G These questions are also the concern of The Rule of Law,
a dialogue on paper put together under the editorship of Robert
Paul Wolff,7 no doubt occasioned by many of the same circumstances
that suggested Rostow's two inquiries. Both books are filled with
declarations, as if they were needed, of the existence of a crisis of law.
Rostow finds the crisis in the "waves of riots and of disobedience to
law which have become the most critical problems of our time."8'
For Wolff, the crisis of our age is the question of "the authority and
legitimacy of the secular political order."0 This larger view of the
nature of the crisis, as one which calls into question basic habits of
authority and obedience, motivates the inquiry of his volume into the
history, nature, institutions and rationale of the law. It is this differ-
ence of perspective, rather than the character of the contributors or
the circumstances under which their essays were delivered that funda-
mentally distinguishes the impact of the two books.' 0
Rostow, whose introduction and long paper dominate the first 100
pages of Is Law Dead?, lives in a society in which "there are no issues
of greater urgency" than the questions "What is law, what is it for,
and is it up to its tasks . . . ?"11 Rostow's society is threatened by
cataclysms-student riots and college-presidential doubts of the integ-
rity of the judicial process. It is a society moving rapidly to achieve
"equality for the Negro," coping with accelerating urbanization, ex-
periencing "doubt" about its foreign policy. It is a society demanding
6. Rostow, Introduction, in Is LAw DE,,D? 14 (E. Rostow ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as Rosrow]. On seeing the book on our kitchen table, my daughter voiced the title
question. Her brother replied, "No, but it has a bad case of Richard Nixon.' "'Social
justice,'" said the White House official who asked to remain unidentified. "is not a
panacea for the world's problems." Shabecoff, The Poor Charge that Phase I and Phase
2 Perpetuate the Status Quo and Social Injustice, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1972, at 37, col. 1.
7. He put the book together "without the artificiality of committee meetings, memo-
randa, and weekend conferencesl" Wolff, Introduction, in TnE RuLE oF Lw 9 (R. Wolff
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as WoLFF].
8. Rostow, Introduction, in Rosrow, supra note 6, at 13.
9. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, in id. at 110. He was speaking here as a participant
at the City Bar symposium. He and Ronald Dworkin are the only persons whose work
appears in both books.
10. Wolff chose his authors, he says, on the ground that they were "scholars dis.
tinguished by the originality of their minds and the provocative force of their previous
writings." Wolff, Introduction, in WOLFF, supra note 7, at 9. The symposiasts before the
City Bar, selected on Rostow's advice, were described by the presiding officer at the
meetings, Whitney North Seymour, as "a broad spectrum of experts, legal and lay . . .
representing all major schools of thought." Seymour, Foreword, in Rosrow, .supra note
6, at 8.
11. Rostow, Introduction, in Ros-row, supra note 6, at 9.
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better education, even though its youth, having lost consciousness of
good and evil in idealism, contains a faction which feels frustrated
or alienated.1 2
The frame of Is Law Dead? is closed by William H. Riker, who
defines a twofold crisis, "a practical crisis in public peace," and "an
even deeper theoretical crisis."' 3 Looking back upon the symposium
he sees in it a pervasive ideology which fails to meet the need for a
new jurisprudence. His own contribution in that direction is an analy-
sis of public order as a commodity which leads him to define the
subject of the conference more broadly in terms of "how to recon-
struct the social situation so that fewer and fewer people wish to
adopt the noncooperative strategy."' 4 In his view, the situation is one
in which the emphasis must shift from reprisal to redistribution and
the action from the legal to the political arena.'3 If law is not dead
yet, perhaps legalism ought to be put out of its misery.
The much wider space within The Ritle of Law is bounded by the
opening and concluding essays of Howard Zinn and Richard Barnet.
Zinn doesn't live in the same kind of place as Rostow. In his country,
government reports proclaim the existence of "pervasive and viru-
lent"' 6 racial prejudice, millions suffer poverty, corporations plunder
the public, and the nation is engaged in the massacre of women and
children as part of its commitment to a genocidal war. Imperial con-
quest, injustice, oligarchy are the products of "the normal functioning
of society,"' 7 and they, along with poverty and racism, are produced
by law. Barnet's closing essay, Twilight of the Nation-State, describes
a worldwide crisis of authority 8 in which "because of its inherent
structure, the nature of its dominant constituencies, and its system of
values, the nation-state cannot promote development, only depend-
ency." 9 In a time of developing moral perspective on an emerging
world culture, he sees the network of human interaction as transcend-
ing national boundaries and historical time. Not only does this put
the matter in a global context as distinguished from the merely na-
tional setting of the City Bar symposium, but it also clearly locates
the action in the present, on the edge of the future.
At least two centuries separate Barnet's sunset scene from the dawn
12. Id. at 11-13.
13. Riker, Public Safety as a Public Good, in id. at 370.
14. Id. at 382.
15. Id. at 383-85.
16. Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law, in WOLFF, supra note 7, at 20.
17. Id. at 21.
18. Barnet, The Twilight of the Nation-State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, in id. at 221-22.
19. Id. at 229.
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established by Peter Gay's paper, Law, Order, and Enlightenment.2
Despite the valiant efforts of a few contributors and commentators, 2'
the City Bar symposium never really succeeds in pulling away from an
eighteenth century legalism. The symposium was based "on a premise
of unabashed faith in the potentialities of reason, and in the goodness
of man,"22 says Rostow. He could not have known that the Governor
of Ohio would call the National Guard to the campus of Kent State
University on the same day the symposium concluded, but there is no
ready explanation for his apparent obliviousness to the Holocaust,
Hiroshima, My Lai, and the other events, political and intellectual,
which led Jan Myrdal to exclaim, with characteristically twentieth cen-
tury dissonance, "we are not the bearers of consciousness. We are the
whores of reason." 23 Gay baldly states the eighteenth century premise
of liberal legalism: "while not all societies under law are good societies,
no society not under law can be a good society."2 4 Rostow accepts the
premise and returns to the lectern to state the issue at hand in a way
that begs all the crucial questions and misconceives the issues. His dis-
cussion of civil disobedience is in terms of "modern history," "the
liberal state," and "the moral autonomy of the individual."2 5 But the
question, as a few participants in Is Law Dead? struggled to make clear
and many of the authors in The Rule of Law recognize, is whether we
are still in modern history, whether there is a place left for the liberal
state, and whether it is adequate any longer to use a moral vocabulary
grounded in the dichotomy of the individual and the state.
It is precisely Rostow's way of posing the issues which limits the
force of Wolff's argument, In Defense of Anarchism. Beginning with
a postulated moral autonomy of the individual, Wolff examines the
ways in which Kant, Rousseau and, in general, democratic theory,
seek to reconcile that autonomy with the authority of the state. The
conclusion he reaches is that "the theory of democracy is wrong"20 in
suggesting that such a reconciliation can be accomplished, except in
the extraordinary situation of decision by unanimous consent. This
direct attack on democratic theory by an American academic philoso-
pher is itself a sign of the intensity of the crisis. Wolff admits that if
20. Gay, Law, Order and Enlightenment, in Rosrow. supra note 6, at 21.
21. Notably Riker, supra note 13. Cf. Currie, Sociology of Law: The Unashed Ques-
tions, 81 YALE L.J. 134 (1971).
22. Rostow, Introduction, in Rosrow, supra note 6, at 11.
23. J. MYRDAL, CONFESSIONS OF A DISLOYAL EuRoPEAN 201 (1968).
24. Gay, Law, Order and Enlightenment, in Rosrow, supra note 6, at 22.
25. Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic Stale: Of Civil
Disobedience, in id. at 39.
26. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, in id. at 121.
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the notion of an obligation to obey the law were abandoned and
everyone acted on moral conviction "there would be bitter conflict
between men of opposed moral dedication. '21 But the gain in indi-
vidual freedom would be worth it, for "the whole level of private
and public life would be raised to a new level of personal responsi-
bility. 2 8 Lawyers characteristically reply: "If men were angels." 0 To
Rostow, Wolff has made a fetish of individual freedom to the neglect
of equality, happiness, justice and other social values.30 To Carl A.
Auerbach, commentator for Wolff's paper, the anarchist argument is
"absurdly irrelevant to any discussion of the adequacy of our legal
system to cope with the urgent problems of our day,"31 because it
ignores the problem of peaceful adjustment of interests among a
large population in a complex industrial society.
Yet Wolff's position is secure so long as the argument is cast in
eighteenth century terms. He begins his anarchist defense by rejecting
an a priori legalism. "[S]urely no sane man can have so slavish a re-
spect for all law as such that he would argue for submission to any
de facto legal command, irrespective of the circumstances."'" Next,
he argues that the consent of the governed cannot be a warrant for
the exercise of authority over those who did not both directly partici-
pate in the decision and concur in it. Neither the principle of majority
decision nor the practice of representative government can be recon-
ciled with the absolute moral autonomy of the individual which is his
starting point. The ultimate recourse of eighteenth century thought
was the Social Contract. But this conception no longer carries sufficient
metaphoric weight to bind together a society sophisticated in the
meaning of "freedom of contract" and its susceptibility to coercion
by monopoly power holders and manipulation by image makers.3'
The inadequacy of the contract model is rooted in its false premise
of the state of nature-false in its implication that a situation of com-
plete atomistic individualism is a plausible starting point for a theory
of social co-existence. The consequence of that premise in the sphere
of law generally, as it was shown earlier in the century to be for the
position of the laboring class, is to exclude the recognition of group
27. Id. at 118.
28. Id.
29. Auerbach, Comment, in id. at 133.
30. Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic State: Of Civil
Disobedience, in id. at 54-60.
31. Auerbach, Comment, in id. at 130.
32. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, in id. at 113.
33. Stone, Comment, in id. at 100-01.
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interest. This is the point which underlies Patricia Roberts Harris'
reply to Rostow that his position puts on "the minority the full bur-
den of the majority's refusal to change the stalits quo."34 As she sees
it, civil disobedience, like violence, has the capacity to spread "the
cost of social neglect of the expressed needs of a minority."' 3 It can
be viewed as an example of the choice of a redistributive rather than
a reprisal mode of response.
A conventional analysis of the obligation to obey the law, premised
in eighteenth century individualism, is likely to miss this point. Thus,
Ronald Dworkin's approach to issues of civil disobedience ignores the
factor of group interest. It is cast entirely in terms of individual legal
moral rights, in terms of "the dissenter," "God," and "conscience."' 0
In discussing the problem of rights in conflict, Dworkin is at pains
to insist that any balancing must exclude the supposed "right" of the
majority to work its will and must be done exclusively in terms of
the rights of individuals;37 thus inviting the parry that in cases of
conflict a social mechanism (i.e., law) must be invoked as arbiter,
the only other alternative being anarchy.38
Gidon Gottlieb objects to Dworkin's position on just these grounds.
Gottlieb sees the most salient feature of recent civil disobedience to
be its group character.39 It is the activity of "veto-communities," and
anticipates a new multi-cultural politicsA0 This comment anticipates
the principal thrust of Hannah Arendt's paper on civil disobedience.
For her, the distinction between conscientious objector and civil dis-
obedient is crucial.41 The one tradition runs from Thomas Becket
and Thomas More to Howard Levy; the other from Gandhi and
Martin Luther King to the Berrigans. Civil disobedients are organized
minorities-a new manifestation of an old American tradition, volun-
tary associations42-distorted into an individualistic frame by the law's
characteristic individualization of the question of guilt. In the classic
legal phrase, responsibility is personal. Thus the defendants in political
trials despair of ever having the opportunity to present their essentially
group position. "It is as though the legal process were an autopsy."
43
34. Harris, Comment, in id. at 104.
35. Id.
36. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in id. at 171.
37. Id. at 180-81.
38. Auerbach, Comment, in id. at 208.
39. Gottlieb, Comment, in id. at 194.
40. Id. at 197.
41. Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in id. at 220.
42. Id. at 240-42.
43. D. BERRIGAN, Tim TR.AL OF THE CATONSViLLE NINE 114 (1970).
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This note of the law's neglect of group rights resonates throughout
Harold Cruse's paper, The Historical Roots of American Social
Change and Social Theory. Cruse calls for solutions predicated "upon
group survival"44 within a polity structured on a "multi-group, multi-
cultural basis."4 As it stands, the Constitution, in good eighteenth
century fashion, "does not safeguard, and never has safeguarded, the
rights of outgroups. ' 46 (Arendt concurs in the need for constitutional
recognition of group rights, by specific amendment if necessary,4
but neither of them explains what form this protection could take
and yet fit within a constitution framed in terms of individual rights
and majority rule.) Cruse here enters his denial to Rostow's claims
that the law is moving rapidly to establish equality for the black48
and that the internment of persons of Japanese descent during World
War Two was "cured" by "the normal procedures of democratic law
and politics." 49 It is not enough for Cruse that Rostow takes "the
view that the long resistance of the South to the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, was morally wrong,"' 0 so long as those words
are allowed to mask the reality of Jim Crow and Judge Lynch or to
equate the Freedom Riders with those who perpetrated the Orange-
burg massacre. For Cruse, the question put by the title of the book
is more than a rhetorical gambit, more than merely ironic-it is down-
right insulting, since "from the very outset, the law was always dead
or ineffective for blacks."a1
Cruse's fellow historian, the late David Potter, implicitly agrees.522
The philosophic argument sketched in the papers by Rostow, Gay,
Wolff, and Dworkin is shown to be an historical sequence as well.
Eighteenth century liberal thought, in supplanting divinity and tra-
dition as a source of law, exposed the dilemma of law in a society of
less than perfect homogeneity.53 Consent became the keystone of the
liberal arch. The Social Contract was the agreement to keep conflict
44. Cruse, The Historical Roots of American Social Change and Social Theory, in
RosTow, supra note 6, at 329.
45. Id. at 322.
46. Id. at 327.
47. Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in id. at 242.
48. Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic State: Of
Civil Disobedience, in id. at 69.
49. Id. at 80-81.
50. Id. at 86.
51. Cruse, The Historical Roots of American Social Change and Social Theory, in id.
at 326.
52. Potter, Changing Patterns of Social Cohesion and the Crisis of Law Under a
System of Government by Consent, in id. at 260.
53. Id. at 261.
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within boundsr 4 In fact this could be accomplished only by a ruthless
exclusion of certain groups from membership in the polity and by a
socially enforced conformity of basic values, attitudes and outlooks."
(Thus, Rostow reveals the true character of the social contract in his
attempt to refute the argument for participatory democracy: "children
...have always been regarded as members of the community, pro-
tected by its laws, and bound by them as well. So were women, during
the centuries without number before they were accepted legally as
the equals of men.") 51 In short, the Social Contract is a set of terms
dictated by the powerful to the powerless and endorsed by "reason,"
which means the prevailing view of society maintained by those in
power. Consent, says Charles Dyke in his paper for the symposium,
is "part of a flimflam designed to divert attention from the actual
distribution of power .... "
Social conformity could operate in this powerful way so long as the
society was a structure of small communities. But change in the scale
of society has allowed the formation of new communities, not neces-
sarily located in particular territory, which are in conflict over values,
attitudes and outlook.58 These "veto-communities" cry out for a multi-
cultural polity. Since "law is a uniform system of social control for the
entire population living within a given jurisdiction,"5'  this develop-
ment has seriously undermined the foundation of the legalistic nation-
state. In the face of this, we still turn to law for remedy, from national
habit, but find it unable to answer the call. As Edgar S. Cahn says,
after hearing Arendt, "As a profession committed to the rule of law,
we have no forum, no means to accommodate, to cope with, the
realities to which she has addressed herself."00 Civil disobedience is
thereby revealed to be, not a scourge, nor a problem, but a "sign of
the inner instability and vulnerability of existing governments and
legal systems." 6'
IlI
On this challenging ground the opening essay of The Rule of Law
begins. Saved from the burden of struggling to escape the eighteenth
54. Id. at 266.
55. Id. at 273-74.
56. Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic State: Of
Civil Disobedience, in id. at 70.
57. Dyke, Freedom, Consent, and the Costs of Interaction, in id. at 157.
58. Potter, Changing Patterns of Social Cohesion and the Crisis of Law Under a System
of Government by Consent, in id. at 281.
59. Id. at 260.
60. Cahn, Comment, in id. at 243.
61. Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in id. at 220.
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century context established by Gay and the questions loaded by
Rostow, the book moves rapidly and forcefully to come to grips with
the deeper issues with which only a few of the authors of principal
papers in Is Law Dead? seem ready to engage.
In The Conspiracy of Law, Howard Zinn fires the opening salvo of
the attack from the Left. Zinn directly denies the major claims usually
made for the virtues of the rule of law. Against the claim that law
brings needed order to society, he argues that it creates as much dis-
order as it does order, only at different levels of experience. 2 Against
the claim that law is an instrument of social justice, he contends that
the rule of law has brought no fundamental change in the distribution
of wealth and power. 3 It is the law which supports "the anarchy of
the economic order";64 gives priority to the protection of property
over person; suppresses radical critics of the privileged and their
power; countenances a broad discretion in the control of the lives
of the powerless; ignores illegality of government actions; ties us to
the past in the face of the need for exponential change; forecloses
major social restructuring by absorbing social energy in pursuit of
minor, incremental reforms; discriminates in practice on the basis of
locally narrow, class and racial prejudices; recognizes explicitly its
subservience to the structure of power by denying the justiciability of
fundamental attacks upon that structure; and, in general, serves pri-
marily to shield the predator from his prey.0 5
Because it is a collection of essays, The Rule of Law has no com-
mentators to interject a quick nod of approval or a sharp jibe of
criticism before the main dialogue continues. Edgar Z. Friedenberg
swiftly picks up the cudgels. He agrees with Zinn that the relationship
between law and justice is unambiguous: "if Law is to perform its
social function, Justice must yield to Law." 60 But he finds ambiguity
in the relations of law and order and of law and liberty. He is willing
to concede that law contributes to social stability and continuity. Yet
he sees law as legitimizing some forms of order at the expense of others,
and he contends that nearly all the violence done in the world is done
by the agents of legitimate authority.67 Thus, in the net, his view of
the relationship of law and order is not fundamentally different from
that of Zinn. And, although he concedes that the courts sometimes are
62. Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law, in WoLFF, supra note 7, at 16.
63. Id. at 17.
64. Id. at 25.
65. Id. at 24-35.
66. Friedenberg, The Side Effects of the Legal Process, in id. at 37.
67. Id. at 42-43.
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defenders of liberty, even if their defense often has been reluctant and
unduly parsimonious, Friedenberg warns that at best legal liberty may
be a trap, because it legitimates "only a political style that is mani-
festly archaic and irrelevant."0 18
There is more than a little irony in the fact that Is Law Dead?
raises the spectre of violence in its title yet proceeds to emphasize the
relatively peaceful phenomenon of civil disobedience, while The Rule
of Law moves swiftly to declare, if not entirely to embrace, a situation
of revolutionary violence. For Zinn and Friedenberg, the question of
civil disobedience is no longer of great consequence. "A general 'ob-
ligation to obey the law' is a poor guide at a time when revolutionary
changes are needed and we are racing against ominous lines on the
social cardiograph,"0' 9 says Zinn, while to Friedenberg, civil disobedi-
ence, insofar as it assumes fidelity to law, is nonsensical under con-
temporary conditions. ° The argument that the civil disobedient should
-take his punishment" in order to make a moral point is, from a revo-
lutionary perspective, to concede the essential fairness of the rules of
the game and thereby to give away the whole matter at issue. Winning
is the only moral victory, and there is little chance of that in the state's
own courts, since even an acquittal comes at an exorbitant price in
time, money and energy.7' And the distinction between the use of
legitimate force and resort to violence evaporates completely in the
heat of Wolff's anarchist analysis. Violence, says Wolff, implies the
illegitimate use of force. But since state power cannot be justified
against the moral autonomy of the individual, all use of force is vio-
lence, whether or not it purports to be in the name of the state, the
commonwealth, or the people."2 It is in this sense that Friedenberg
has meant his argument that most violence in the world is done in
the name of the state-arrest, punishment, and war.
Thus, these three authors describe a situation which Daniel J.
Boorstin and Anthony F.C. Wallace seek to explain. Both see the
crisis as the product of an imbalance between two tendencies. Boor-
stin's distinction between a time of belief in law as instrumental (a
tool subject to our shaping) and a time of belief in law as immanent
(outside human control)73 parallels Wallace's distinction between a
period of procedural morality (of faith in the ability to achieve wants,
68. Id. at 47.
69. Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law, in id. at 35.
70. Friedenberg, The Side Effects of the Legal Process, in id. at 47.48.
71. Id. at 50.
72. Wolff, Violence and the Law, in id. at 59-61.
73. Boorstin, The Perils of Indwelling Law, in id. at 78.
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including justice, by following established procedure) and a period
of teleological morality (of conviction that substantive goals must be
given precedence, that ends do justify means).1 '
Wallace identifies the danger, as many of the authors did in Is Law
Dead?, as being that the zeal of the revitalization movement, with its
teleological morality, will push the fearful proceduralists into repres-
sion, culminating in a cycle of heightening tension that bursts into
destructive violence. 75 The argument is similar to the liberal's familiar
assertion of the evil consequences of a radical moralism which is im-
patient, harsh, puritanical and unwilling to compromise.
Dworkin, who had argued in Is Law Dead? for a strong view of
the rights of citizens against their government, 6 and who had sug-
gested that the general duty to obey the law becomes almost inco-
herent in the face of that concept of rights,77 attempts to provide a
corrective to the imbalance and a means whereby law can avoid the
threat of death "by fire or ice."78 He thinks that radicals and con-
servatives have divided themselves unnecessarily by their acceptance
of a positivist view of law. The positivist view leads to a sharp sepa-
ration of law and morality, individual rights and social obligations.
If the source of commitment to its underlying principle of obligation
to obey the law is rejected-for example, because of the law's injustice
-loyalty to social norms crumbles. 0 Dworkin proposes an alternate
theory in which legal institutions are seen as being enmeshed in other
social practices and conventions. On this view ideological division
which threatens a crisis of violence may be lessened if both sides can
recognize their common commitment to the convention of social ob-
ligation and the practice of principled argument.8 0 Only the renuncia.
tion of social obligation altogether or the rejection of principled argu-
ment stands between us and a means of rapprochement. If the con-
vention of social obligation and the practice of principled argument
are accepted, all that remains to separate people in society is the
content of their faith in particular social conventions or principles of
criticism. The argument of eighteenth century liberalism has been re-
stated, but not fundamentally improved.
Dworkin's liberal analysis does not satisfy, in part because it is
74. Wallace, Violence, Morality and Revitalization, in id. at 100-07.
75. Id. at 107-09.
76. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Rosrow, supra note 6, at 168.
77. Id. at 179.
78. Cahn, Comment, in id. at 390.
79. Dworkin, Philosophy and the Critique of Law, in WOLFF, supra note 7, at 166.67.
80. Id. at 168-69.
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precisely the loss of confidence in the validity of our major social
conventions-marriage, the industrial corporation, the nation-state,
representative government-and the lack of agreement upon the na-
ture and priority of the principles of social criticism-equality, lib-
eration, participation-which defines the present moment. Dworkin's
analysis also assumes that Wallace and company have correctly iden-
tified the danger to law as being the threat of a crisis of violence.
Boorstin, however, has a more sophisticated view of the danger. Be-
cause of its sophistication, it can be accused of being too intellectu-
alized, too removed from the brute facts of violence or garbage in
the streets. Yet if civil disobedience, and rebellious violence, are an
index of a deeper social malaise, Boorstin's diagnosis deserves careful
examination. For the danger he sees is that law will be pressed into
service beyond its capacity, not merely to facilitate social life but as
a substitute for it. He fears that in our quest to know the facts of
social life and to make law consistent with them that we will reduce law
to an affirmation of the status quo, and will succumb to the tempta-
tion to make social science the means of making law into a mirror of
society, a mere tautology.8 '
This discussion has at last reached the point portended by Charles
Dyke's important observation in Is Law Dead?, that while some tech-
nique of controlling the costs of social interaction is needed, there is a
paucity of proof that any particular technique is essential.8 2 Law is
merely "a particular technique." Thus, Dyke's point directly contra-
venes the eighteenth century premise that a good society must be a
society under law. Yet we require "a framework of stability"8 3 within
which change can occur. Where can we find a framework adequate to
support social interaction yet able to tolerate even the "exponential
change" which may be needed? The outlines of an answer are found in
the metaphor of a framework itself. If a framework is too tightly built,
with supporting members drawn close together, it ceases to be a frame-
work, it becomes a wall, an enclosure. This is legalism. If the framework
is too loose, it may collapse. This is chaos. If the framework is sup-
portive but spacious, stable but open, it can fulfill its function of
providing a structure of support for change and for life.
The design of the framework is in large part the function of the
81. Boorstin, The Perils of Indwelling Law, in id. at 92-97.
82. Dyke, Freedom, Consent, and the Costs of Interaction, in Rosraw, Supra not 6,
at 147.
83. Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in id. at 228.
1045
The Yale Law Journal
materials available with which to build. Law is one such material.
But what are its characteristics? How flexible is it? How strong? How
well does it combine with other materials to form a complex structure?
Stanley Diamond addresses these issues in what is both literally and
figuratively the central essay in The Rule of Law. Diamond begins
by reasserting a distinction drawn by nineteenth century anthropology
between law and custom. We have lost sight of the distinction, in his
view, because "we live in a law-ridden society; law has cannibalized
the institutions which it presumably reinforces or with which it in-
teracts."8 4 The problem with law is not that it is sickly, but that it
is overgrown and cancerous, blocking out the normal life processes
of society. Law is that "particular technique" for controlling and dis.
tributing the costs of interaction which befits the development of the
nation-state, in which service and for whose profit it exists.85 State
and law seek to objectify their existence, to take a position outside of,
above, society-society under law. The issues earlier posed are turned
on their head. Not civil disobedience, not violence, but law is a
"chronic symptom of the disorder of institutions.""" The struggle for
civil rights is a struggle, within law, against law. 7 And since sub-
stantive law can approach congruence with morality only at the ex-
treme price of legalistic enclosure, civil rights-in the due process sense
of fair procedure-must serve instead as the "assurance of whatever
justice can be obtained under the rule of law."88s Shades of Felix
Frankfurter, Learned Hand, and Henry Hart! A strange synthesis of
Rostow and Zinn, Dworkin and Friedenberg has been achieved.
Where does this synthesis lead? If law befits the nation-state, and
the nation-state is in its twilight, where shall we turn for a framework?
Lon L. Fuller offers a clue by directing us once again to some larger
features of law. Law, in his conception, can be viewed as a "language
of interaction."80 This can be seen in the phenomenon of customary
law, misperceived in the literature of jurisprudence by an undue
emphasis upon its character as formed in habit and maintained in
tradition. Fuller sees this as a misdirected focus on the phonemes of
custom, the repetition of particular items of behavior, to the neglect
of the vocabulary and grammar of social interaction which he calls
84. Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, iii WOLFF, supra note
7, at 117.
85. Id. at 120-31.
86. Id. at 135.
87. Id. at 138.
88. Id. at 139.
89. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in id. at 173.
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customary law. 90 Through its ritual communication, customary law
gives rise to obligation within a set of "stable interactional expectan-
cies," 9' most of which lie beneath consciousness.
The relations of parties under a contract have a similar quality of
"stable interactional expectancies." Even enacted law, the most formal
type, is both dependent on the existence of a structure of such ex-
pectancies between state and citizen and itself serves law's central
purpose of providing "base lines for human interaction"2-the frame-
work of social interaction. Fuller approaches the question of the ap-
propriateness of different types of frameworks with sensitivity and
discrimination. He distinguishes social contexts of great intimacy or
great hostility, in which enacted law and contract can play no useful
role, from the "habitat of friendly strangers, between whom interac-
tional expectancies remain largely open and unpatterned,"'  in which
contracts and enacted law function best. He is in close agreement with
those in Is Law Dead? who saw the challenge to law in the disintegra-
tion of that habitat into the culture of veto-communities. But some of
those participants saw not only the need but even the desirability of a
multicultural organization of the polity, a point which escapes Fuller.
And Fuller's analysis ultimately turns around against his starting point.
For whereas he had begun by seeking to escape a too narrow equation
of law as a general phenomenon with the legal system of the nation-
state, he ends by demonstrating that law shows its greatest capacity to
order interaction in a "large and impersonal" 4 society. Thus does
law embrace alienation.
In this light, Fuller's struggle with the meaning of the term "law"
reveals its significance. He had sought to establish that "customary
law" is an appropriate term by showing that there is a systematic
language of social interaction even in societies in which contractual,
enacted or decisional law are known little if at all.05 He had admitted,
in seeking to describe the practices under contracts as "law," that
this represents a "considerable departure from the conventions we
ordinarily follow"90; in using the term "law." Does his expansive
definition of law help to fulfill the call for a new jurisprudence
or to furnish an adequate concept of law? Or is the depth of his fi-
90. Id. at 172-77.
91. Id. at 187.
92. Id. at 201.
93. Id. at 207.
94. Id. at 215.
95. Id. at 180-86.
96. Id. at 187.
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delity to law so great that it obscures his vision of the limits of legal
capacity, as a "particular technique" to be a language of social inter-
action adequate to the emerging age?
In concluding his essay Fuller restates the familiar jurisprudential
wisdom that to retain its character as a framework of flexible and
open texture, law is forced to deal with acts, not attitudes, and to
measure behavior against rules, rather than applying broad principles
directly to individuals. The symbolism of the law's objectivity thus
achieved is fundamental to sustaining those moral attitudes of both
citizen and government toward each other that maintain the rule of
law.97 One source of difficulty in sustaining those attitudes is evident
to Fuller. Dramatic events may belie the image of legal objectivity
and undermine faith in law's ability to establish justice, ensure do-
mestic tranquility and protect the right to life and liberty. This is
another version of the spectre of the crisis of violence. Another way
in which the symbolism of the rule of law may lose its compelling
force is that the fabric of cultural myth of which it is a part may be
rent by fundamental alterations in our perception of the human
situation.
Wolff is witness to one form of that perception. He is puzzled to ex-
plain why belief in the authority of the state persists, and he calls such
belief "superstitious."' 8 The myth of the social contract has lost its pow-
er as a metaphor for our existence, just as the myth of the Great Chain
of Being had lost its vitality at the beginning of the modern age.99
Wolff, however, is driven increasingly toward the realization of the aw-
ful prospect of social life without an adequate framework of interaction
grounded in cultural myth and symbolism. At the close of his paper
for Is Law Dead? he asks whether if "the theory of legitimate author-
ity" is indeed a myth, it is nonetheless "a myth which men cannot
easily do without."' 00 Here he faces the awesome question of the
relation of truth and politics, knowledge and freedom. The Grand
Inquisitor haunts his dreams, urging again that men are weak, and
that Plato was right in claiming that they must be told a "noble lie"
because their eyes cannot stand the bright harsh light of reality. Wolff
wishes that this were not so, but he is able to offer no proof, only
the observation that "we have survived the death of God, and we
may yet survive the death of the state."'u 0
97. Id. at 213-15.
98. Wolff, Violence and the Law, in id. at 62.
99. See generally A. LovEjoy, TIE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1936).
100. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, in Ros'row, supra note 6, at 129.
101. Wolff, Afterword, in WOLFF, supra note 7, at 248.
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There is a coldness and austerity in Wolff's discussion because in
its respect for sober truth it threatens to exclude recognition of the
function of myth as the basis of culture, of symbol as the ground of
all experience that is peculiarly human. There is no need to despair
belief in myth as such, but there is a great and yet unanswered need
to find a structure of myth and symbol suitable to the new age which
lies beyond our time of crisis.
IV
These twenty essays contribute little to the discussion in contempo-
rary social criticism of the question whether the breakdown of the
old order and the creation of the new one can be accomplished by
peaceful means. What they do reveal is that there is scant evidence
of any capacity in law to be the instrument of peaceful transition.
Law appears instead as a source of violence, as one of the institutions
in decay.
Wallace ends his essay with a plea for the discovery of "the cul-
tural means for making violence unnecessary as a tactic for revitaliza-
tion,"102 and he sees non-violent civil disobedience as a modest exam-
ple. But unless the conditions of underlying moral consensus which
make civil disobedience effective can be realized on a global scale, it
cannot serve as the vehicle of change. Gottlieb thinks that "what is
dying is a set of expectations accompanying the simple vision of law
as superior power." 10 3 A new system "may look to mediation, col-
lective bargaining, negotiations," 10 4 and other non-coercive settlement
procedures. But this solution, via another form of procedural morality,
also depends on the existence of and belief in a basic level of common
interest stronger than the divisive forces of exploitation, injustice and
oppression. Justification for such belief in the present distribution of
wealth and power is miniscule. How troubled the course of transition
in the next century or two will be is in part a function of the develop-
ment of new "cultural means" or the renewal of old ones, but it is
also a function of the extent of the dislocation of present power that
must occur, the size of the gap between the dying and the emergent
cultures that must be closed, and the speed with which a new set of
"stable interactional expectancies" can be established. Understanding
the transition-and thereby improving our ability to act wisely during
102. Wallace, Violence, Morality, and Revitalization, in id. at 113.
103. Gottlieb, Comment, in Rosrow, supra note 6, at 201.
104. Id.
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our time-requires not only that we comprehend the character of
the dying age, that we understand our transitional state, but also that
we clarify as much as we can our vision of the new age, so that we
may be guided by our hope for the future as well as our anguish for
the present and our dissatisfaction with the past.
What we are seeking then is a framework of social interaction,
within a context of myth and symbol which adequately voices a per-
ception of the human situation and speaks a language whose vocabu-
lary and grammar can convey the subtle range of the color, texture
and rhythm of that situation. In search of that framework we must
first define the situation itself, then state the contours of the language
of social interaction that befits it, outline the myth structure that
would sustain a framework of interaction in that situation in that
language, and thus gain a glimpse of the character of the framework
we seek. It is a formidable task, a task whose urgency is established
by both these books, which both have helped to define, but whose
fulfillment neither offers. For myself, following Auden,
Although I can at least confine
Your vanity and mine
To stating timidly
A timid similarity,
We shall boast anyway: 10 5
The situation is apocalyptic. We are at war with the elements. We
live in the shadow of the fire of the bomb, in polluted waters, gasping
for air, on earth depleted of its nurturing resources. We are driven
to a consciousness of our mortality. The situation is global. No longer
can we escape to a new frontier, colonize another people, steal Lebens-
raum from our fellows. No longer can we find safety within the
walls of our cave, our village, our castle, our city, our nation. We
are forced to recognize that we all live in the same ghetto. The situa-
tion is ecological. We cannot continue to exploit nature, to consume
life, to feed on others. We act and we alter the world around us. We
are aware that the situation is not just the human situation but the
situation of life as part of the processes larger than life. We are com-
pelled to realize that we are one with nature. The situation is tech-
nological. We cannot avoid the imperative of the machine. Our tools
are an extension of our selves; they are part of us and part of our
situation. We cannot justify a renunciation of their potential even
105. Auden, Law Like Love, in THE COLLECTED POMrRY OF W.H. AUDEN 74, at 76 (19-15).
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though we understand that it is a power that can be used for evil as
well as for good, and that a worship of its power surely leads to evil.
We are constrained to admit that we are human beings, the toolmakers.
The situation is psychological. We are in a crisis of identity, seeking
a new consciousness, trying to set our minds straight. Our obsession
with rationality has proven unreasonable, pure reason has become
irrational. We cannot deny our senses and our emotions. We must
act as well as know, experience as well as understand. The situation
is evolutionary. We cannot live in the past, we cannot even grasp
hold of the present as it drifts through our fingers, we must live for
the future. The context of time cannot be limited to a generation,
a lifetime, a century, a millennium. We are in process, not stasis. We
live in all time, now and forever.
The contours of the new language of social interaction are becom-
ing more distinct. Because it must be global in scope, capable of cre-
ating a bond of communication across cultures, yet able to live along-
side of the particular languages of each culture, its symbolic system
must have a universal character. Both the work of structural anthro-
pologists and the efforts to establish extra-terrestrial communication
suggest the possibility of the clearer definition of universal symbolic
patterns. If these can become part of our vocabulary, they can be
transmitted through electronic media which are capable of reproduc-
ing not only sight and sound, but, ultimately the full range of human
sense experience. As in traditional cultures, there can be great capacity
for symbolic interaction in the communication of this large range of
sense data variables. Technology can provide the vast information
handling capacity which is critical to coping with a high order of
complexity and a rapid speed of change in the global situation.
Just as law is a particular species of language, a set of linguistic
categories and, at any given moment, the particular literature they
have yielded, so in this new language must there evolve a set of con-
cepts and categories of social interaction, the structural timbers of the
new framework. Looking at law allows us to anticipate some of the
general relations which will be expressed in this new language, even
if we cannot yet fully apprehend the form they will take. Contract,
for example, is a particular legal manifestation of a more general
principle of social relationship: reciprocity. In modem contract law,
the emphasis is on promise, expectation, voluntarism, and exchange.
But reciprocity has many other social manifestations, both in and
beyond the law. Similarly, litigation is a particular stylized form of
organized conflict. Its limits increasingly are being charted, and our
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awareness of those limits is drawing us toward a renewal of the under-
standing that the resolution of conflict is a more general activity.
The particular content of the behavioral directions in any language
of social interaction is a vector of its values. That is to say, the sentences
in the language of social interaction which happen to be considered
valid sentences by those who use it are neither all the possible sentences
which might be generated in it nor a random selection from them but
instead a selected set, chosen in the light of purposes, goals and values,
For many traditional societies the primary goal was group survival,
dictated by the fragility of group existence. The starting point for
the social myth of such a culture is in an original moment of moral
subjection. (The expulsion from the garden.) For modern liberal
culture, faced with the challenge of conquering new territory, the
chief goal was growth, progress. The starting point for the social myth
of such a culture was the compact forged in an original state of moral
autonomy. (The state of nature.) The emerging global culture has
integration as its goal, at all levels of existence. A social myth for this
culture must begin in an assumed moment of moral interdependence.
(Spaceship earth.) A renewed understanding of our common hu-
manity, our common peril, can lead toward a definition of freedom
which is not merely liberty from, but liberation to; a definition of
equality which does not rest with the evenhanded administration of
opportunity to unequals, but demands a distributive justice which
compensates for inequalities, whatever their origin; a definition of
participation which is not satisfied with representation, but claims
the right to direct involvement in the determination of the common
good.
The framework for social interaction which we are seeking, whose
emergence we await at the end of the present period of crisis and
transformation, will satisfy only if it can embrace these values, employ
this language, fit this situation. It must be subtle and complex enough
to communicate in a structure of time which is no longer linear, uni-
directional, and evenly measured and in a frame of space which is
no longer two dimensional and bounded. It must establish a multi-
dimensional network, a truer replica of the web of life than the model
of law can be expected to achieve. Within this network, no doubt, law
will continue to serve in those spheres of human relations where a
mediation of the distance between principle and particular instruction
can be measured by a rule, governed by a rule, stated in a rule. But
the situation will not allow us to rely nearly so much as we do now
upon hurling law into the breach of ignorance. We will be pressed
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to have knowledge, in advance, of the particular consequences of par-
ticular decisions in particular situations as we seek the kind of choice
which is alone meaningful in a situation of complete global interde-
pendence. The mode of social decisionmaking must be able to render
advisory opinions in "polycentric" situations, 00 and render them con-
tinuously and instantaneously. The tyranny that such a situation of
urgency might bring to us has been foreseen by many who have
prophesied the direction of our culture. Protection against that tyran-
ny, the analogue in the emerging culture to civil liberties, must be
evolved, as was the case with liberty under law, within its own terms.
In the process of that evolution, we may have to experience some sharp
reversals. It will be difficult to accommodate to the notion that se-
curity does not reside in exclusivity of possession, identity does not
find its strongest protection in a wall of privacy. And if the new con-
cepts are not to smother, in each there must be a commitment to open-
ness, to change, to a receptivity to newcomers.
These, at least, are the shadows on the wall of our cave. Through
them, perhaps, we may yet find a way to a world beyond the crisis
of law.
106. See Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, in PRocEE.iNcs oF "ic AMlERCAN
SocEry OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1960). See also Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the
Arbitration, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 18-42.
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